Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise and fall of gurus by Tedeschi, G. et al.
Tedeschi, G., Iori, G. & Gallegati, M. (2012). Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise and 
fall of gurus. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 81(1), pp. 82-96. doi: 
10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.006 
City Research Online
Original citation: Tedeschi, G., Iori, G. & Gallegati, M. (2012). Herding effects in order driven 
markets: The rise and fall of gurus. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 81(1), pp. 82-
96. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.006 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/12363/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Herding effects in order driven markets: the
rise and fall of gurus
Gabriele Tedeschi
Department of Economics
Universita´ Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona, It.
E-mail: gabriele.tedeschi@gmail.com
Giulia Iori
Department of Economics
City University, London, U.K.
E-mail: g.iori@city.ac.uk
Mauro Gallegati
Department of Economics
Universita´ Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona, It.
E-mail: mauro.gallegati@univpm.it
September 22, 2011
Abstract
We introduce an order driver market model with heterogeneous
traders that imitate each other on a dynamic network structure. The
communication structure evolves endogenously via a fitness mecha-
nism based on agents performance. We assess under which assump-
tions imitation, among noise traders, can give rise to the emergence
of gurus and their rise and fall in popularity over time. We study
the wealth distribution of gurus, followers and non followers and show
that traders have an incentive to imitate and a desire to be imitated
since herding turns out to be profitable. The model is then used to
study the effect that different competitive strategies (i.e chartist &
fundamentalist) have on agents performance. Our findings show that
positive intelligence agents can not invade a market populated by noise
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traders when herding is high.
Keywords: dynamic network, herding, guru, order driver
market.
1 Introduction
Mainstream economic theory does not provide a satisfactory explanation for
financial market frenzies, crashes and panics. The standard reasoning, dat-
ing back to Friedman (1953), is that these phenomena, driven by irrational
traders, are irrelevant in the long run since destabilizing speculators would
quickly go bankrupt and be eliminated from the market. Thus, according
to the mainstream literature, the study of rational speculators is enough to
describe the behaviour of stock markets. Nonethelss there is a considerable
evidence that investors do not always act rationally and do not follow the
economists’ advice. Black (1986) suggests that some traders, when they do
not have access to true information, irrationally act on noise, and, following
Kyle (1985), calls such investors ”noise traders”.
The presence of noise traders and their impact on prices’ movement is well
documented. Some authors (Figlewski (1979), Shiller (1984), Campbell and
Kyle (1987), De Long et al. (1990a)) show that if ’rational agents’ are risk
averse, then their ability to take positions against noise traders, who drive
prices away from their fundamental value, is limited.
An important mechanism that may explain the deviation of prices from their
fundamental value is the formation of expectations. Expectations drive in-
dividual behaviours and individual behaviours determine the economic out-
come, i.e., prices and trading. ”Therefore, a market, like other social envi-
ronments, may be viewed as an expectations feedback system” (Heemeijer
et al. (2009)). An intuition of how expectations feedback system with ’zero
intelligence agents’1 works is as follows. If noise traders share pessimistic ex-
pectations about an asset, they will sell it frantically, driving down its price.
An informed trader who may want to buy the asset will update his expec-
tations recognizing that in the near future noise traders might become even
more pessimistic and drive price down even further. The informed trader may
eventually conclude that it is not convenient for him to buy now. Conversely,
if the informed trader wants to sell an asset about which noise traders have
optimistic expectations, that would drive the price up, he may decide not
1Our market is populated by agents with naive trading strategies, called noise traders.
In this way we are close to the tradition of Zero-Intelligence (ZI) traders as in (Becker
(1962), Gode et al. (1993), Gode et al. (1997).
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to sell. Thus convergence to the rational equilibrium price becomes unlikely.
In fact, because of the unpredictability of noise traders, prices can fluctuate
significantly even when the fundamental price is stable.
It is generally accepted in the economic works on noise traders that ”positive
feedback” traders prevail in financial markets. Theoretical models and labo-
ratory experiments of positive feedback2 have been studied in De Long et al.
(1990a, 1990b), Marimon and Sunder (1993), Geber et al. (2002), Hommes
et al. (2005, 2007, 2008), Heemeijer et al. (2009), Sutan and Willinger (2009)
and Adam (2007)). All these works have shown that positive feedback irra-
tional noise traders, if sufficiently aggressive, can destabilize prices and earn
larger returns.
An important question is why traders’ expectations are often coordinated.
Claude Trichet (2001) remarked: ”Some operators have come to the conclu-
sion that it is better to be wrong along with everybody else, rather than take
the risk of being right or wrong alone”3. This ”mass-uniform” behaviour was
already present in Keynes (1936) who called it ”animal spirits”.
Some insights into fluctuations in prices and coordination of expectations
have been provided by agent-based models. For example Lux and March-
esi (2000), Iori (2002) , Chiarella et al. (2002, 2009), Kirman and Teyssiere
(2002), LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2003), Gaunersdorfer et al. (2008), and LeBaron
et al. (2007, 2009) have analyzed how the co-ordination of traders’ strategies
by market mediated interactions (for example by following chartist trad-
ing rules) or mechanisms of behavioural switching can lead to large aggre-
gate fluctuations. In particular Brock and Hommes (1998) consider an asset
pricing model with agents switching between fundamentalists and chartists
expectations, based upon the recent performance (profits) of these strate-
gies. Chartists survive in the market, because their (short run) profits are
higher than those of fundamentalists. In a similar vein, Lux (1998) consid-
ers a fundamentalists-chartists model with switching driven by profits and
by herding behavior (measured by an opinion index). In the Lux model
the performance of a strategy is thus affected by its profitability and by the
popularity of the strategy. A good survey of this type of work is Hommes
(2006), where these models and how they contradict Friedman’s hypothesis
have been extensively discussed.
2Positive feedback in a stock market refer to the situation where positive (negative)
expectations about the price do lead to a price increase (decrease)
3Claude Trichet , then Governor of the Banque de France.
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Collective behaviour nonetheless could reflects the phenomenon known
as herding which occurs in situations with information externalities, when
agents’ private information is swamped by the information derived from di-
rectly observing others’ actions (Bannerjee (1992, 1993); Orle´an (1995); Cont
and Bouchaud (1999), Stauffer and Sornette (1999), Iori (2002), Markose et
al. (2004), LeBaron et al. (2009)). Most of the studies on herding effects
have focused on how herding can lead to large price fluctuation but only a
few papers have investigated its role on the communication network structure
and on traders’ wealth, which is the focus of this paper.
We introduce a model where agents imitate the expectations of the most
successful traders called the Guru4. Price formation is determined by an
order-driven market, as in Chiarella et al. (2009). Within their budget con-
straints, agents can place market orders or limit orders for arbitrary quan-
tities. Limit orders are stored in the book and executed (partially or com-
pletely) when they find a matching market order on the opposite side. A
market order is filled completely if it finds enough capacity on the book, or
partially otherwise. The motivation to use an order-driven market is to avoid
the limitations of the market maker approach in which there is no explicit
mechanism of trading. In fact, the market maker, typically risk neutral and
endowed with unbounded liquidity, absorbs excess demand and makes trad-
ing always viable, regardless of its size. In each period, the market maker
adjusts the price to reduce the excess demand. Inspired by the metaphor of
the Walrasian taˆtonnement, this price-adjusting rule fails to recognize that
in a real market trade occurs whenever two agents can match their requests
at a given price. Because of the simplistic pricing rule adopted by the mar-
ket maker, herding (that normally leads to a large excess demand) has an
obvious and immediate impact on prices.
In an order driven market, where agents imitate the expectations of others
and not their action, the role of imitation is less obvious. In fact even if
the guru expects a price increase, he himself and/or the agents that imitate
his expectations may submit limit orders instead of market orders, and the
impact of these trades on the price may be negligible or may be delayed.
Recent models that are related to our are those of Markose et al. (2004),
LeBaron et al (2009), and Gerasymchuk et al. (2010). Markose et al. (2004)
4Agent based models have taken many different approaches as to how strategy infor-
mation could be shared outside price system (see Vriend (2000)).”Obviously, the correct
model for information sharing is not identifiable, but it is clear that some imitation must
take place in financial markets”-Le Baron (2009).
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develop a model where agents make a binary decision, to buy or sell a single
unit of an asset, following the average advice of the other agents they are con-
nected to. The interaction network evolves dynamically as agents adaptively
modify the weights of their links to their neighbours by reinforcing ”good”
advisors and breaking away from ”bad” advisors. The question Markose et
al. address is whether and when the dynamic process of reinforced learning
can lead to the creation of small world networks. Nonetheless trading is not
explicitly modelled in their model and the wealth of agents is not monitored.
LeBaron et al. (2009), instead, develop a dynamic limit order model where
traders make weighted forecasts of assets future returns by combining fun-
damental, chartist and noise rules, following Chiarella et al (2009). As time
goes by, agents do trade and look at their own past performances (measured
in term of their expected prices versus realized prices) and update the weights
of their trading rules via a genetic algorithm that selects those parameters
which have performed better. Gerasymchuk et al. (2010) studies the effect of
alternative exogenous information network structure in the Brock-Hommes
asset pricing model. Agents are located on the nodes of a network and can
observe the fitness measure of the strategies employed only by those agents
who reside on the nodes directly connected with them. The authors show
that the network structure influences the stability and volatility of the as-
set price dynamics, due to the different speed of information transmission
in different networks. In these last two models there is no direct imitation
among traders and coordination arises when traders dynamically adopt the
same rule.
In our model all agents are uninformed noise traders and directly imitate
each other. The originality of this work respect to our previous version
(Tedeschi et al. (2009)) is in the communication network. In Tedeschi et al.
the guru was fixed exogenously and each agent decided whether to imitate
him or not with a given probability. Here we introduce an endogenous mech-
anism of imitation, by implementing a preferential attachment rule (Baraba´si
and Albert (1999)) such that each trader is imitated by others with a prob-
ability proportional to its profit5. This mechanism of links formation allows
5In 1955 Herbert Simon showed that power laws arise when ’the rich get richer’, when
the amount you get goes up with the amount you already have. In sociology this is referred
to as Matthew effect (see Merton (1968)) with reference to the biblical edict. Today,
this phenomenon is usually known under the name ’preferential attachment’, coined by
Barabasi and Albert (1999). Bianconi and Barabasi (2001) have proposed an extension
of Barabasi and Albert. In their model each newly appearing vertex i is given a ’fitness’
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us to study under which assumptions a gurus endogenously rise and fall over
time, and how imitation affects the asset price and the distribution of agents
wealth.
Although agents in our model initially start with the same amount of stock
and cash, when imitation is high, trading generates a fat tail distribution of
individuals’ wealth, in accordance with the empirical evidence that market
participants are very heterogeneous in size (see, for example, Pareto (1897),
Zipf (1949), Ijiri and Simon (1977), Axtell (2001), Pushkin and Aref (2004),
Gabaix et al. (2006)). Moreover, in contrast with the prevailing economic
view that informed agents need to hide their private informations in order
to profit from it6 (see Benabou and Laroque (1992), Caldentey and Stac-
chetti (2007), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2008)), our uninformed gurus gain
the highest profits when they reveal their expectations to the highest number
of followers. Furthermore, we will also show that followers, on average, gain
higher profit then non followers, thus providing a justification for herding to
occur in the first place. Since our baseline model deals with zero-intelligence
traders, it seems worthwhile to ask whether more sophisticated agents, such
as Chartists and Fundamentalists, can overperform gurus in a market domi-
nated by herding. Thus, we use the model as a computational laboratory to
run some preliminary experiments on the role of different competitive strate-
gies. Our findings show that while chartist and fundamentalist strategies are
both successful in the absence of herding, they underperform the guru and
his followers when imitation is high.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the
model; in section 3 we present the results of the baseline model simulations;
in section 4 we present results when including competing chartists and fun-
damentalists strategies, and section 5 concludes.
that represents its attractiveness and thus its propensity to gain more links. When one
considers a fitness algorithm it is true that the larger the fitness the larger the degree but
a large degree is a consequence of some intrinsic quality, not the cause of the improvement
of site connectivity. In our model this intrinsic quality is, precisely, the agents’ profit.
6In fact revealing private intentions, specially for large agents, could decrease their
fitness. For this reason large investors refrain from revealing their demand, supply or their
expectation (see Vaglica et al. (2008)).
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2 The model
2.1 The network
We start the description of the model by explaining formation and evolution
of the communication network. In our network, nodes represents agents and
edges are the connective links between them. Links are directional, they are
created and deleted by agents who look for advice and point to the agent
that provides advice. Information travels in the the opposite direction.
In general local interaction models agent interacts directly with a finite num-
ber of others in the population. The set of nodes with whom a node is
linked is referred to as its neighbourhoods. In our model the number of out-
going links is constrained to be one, thus agents can only get advice from
one neighbor. The reason being that in a highly connected random network
synchronisation could be achieved via indirect links. The effects of direct
imitation are easier to be tested in a diluted network where indirect synchro-
nisation is less likely to arise.
We implement an endogenous mechanism of preferential attachment based
on a fitness parameter given by agent’s wealth. Agents start with the same
amount of cash Ct=0 and stocks St=0, so that all agents have the same initial
wealth Wt=0 = Ct=0 + pt=0St=0. As time goes by, some traders may become
richer than others. As a measure of agents’ success we define their fitness at
time t as their wealth relative to the wealth Wmaxt of the richest agent imax:
f it =
W it
Wmaxt
. (1)
Each agent i starts with one outgoing link with a random agent j, and
possibly with some incoming links from other agents. Links are rewinded
at the beginning of each period, in the following way: each agent i cuts its
outgoing link, with agent k, and forms a new link, with a randomly chosen
agent j, with a probability
pir =
1
1 + e−βi(f
j
t−fkt )
,
or keep its existing link with probability 1 − pir. The rewind algorithm is
designed so that successful traders, here called gurus, gain a higher num-
ber of incoming links and thus have a higher probability of being imitated.
Nonetheless the algorithm introduces a certain amount of randomness, and
links with more successful agent have a finite probability to be cut in favour
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of links with less successful agents. In this way we model imperfect informa-
tion and bounded rationality of agents. The randomness also helps unlocking
the system from the situation where all agents link to the same guru.
2.2 The expectation formation mechanism
Trading happens over a number of periods tk, with k = 1, · · ·T . At the
beginning of each trading period tk, agents make idiosyncratic expectations
about the spot return, rˆitk,tk+τ in the interval (tk, tk + τ). We assume that
agents are not informed and have random expectation about future returns.
We also assume that agents are heterogeneous in that they have different
forecasts of the returns’ volatility, σit. Idiosyncratic expected returns are
thus given by
rˆitk,tk+τ = σ
i
tk
ǫitk , (2)
where σitk is a positive, agent specific, constant and ǫt ∼ N(0, 1) is a normal
noise.
After individual expectation are generated, a consultation round starts dur-
ing which agents sequentially, and in a random order, revise their expecta-
tions. The revised expected return is obtained by weighing agent i’s own
expectation with that of agent j to which i is linked to
ritk,tk+τ = wrˆ
i
tk,tk+τ
+ (1− w)rˆjtk,tk+τ , (3)
where w measures the impact that agent j’s expectation has on the agent
i’s expectation. When w is equal to zero, i trusts completely the opinions
of j, while, when w is equal to one, i considers exclusively his own opinion
and agents decisions are fully independent from each other. At the end of
each period tk, after trading has taken place, agents expectations are reset
to random values. We stress that in the model imitation is purely expecta-
tion based, and agents do not observe the actions of others. This choice is
motivated by the fact that in a real market the order book is not normally
fully visible to traders, and that the order submission is anonymous.
While our agents do not have a priori information about price movements,
they do acquire some information via the imitation mechanism. An agent
who realizes to have several incoming links knows (when w is small) he will
be able to influence the decisions of several others, and can better predict
future demand. Highly popular agents thus become overoptimistic or over-
pessimistic. This effect is incorporated in the model by assuming that the
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volatility of forecasted returns is proportional to the number of incoming
links and to the weights w, such that
σitk = σ
i
0(1 + l
%
i,tk
(1− w)), (4)
where l%i,tk in the percentage of existing links that point to agent i at time tk.
The values of σi0 are chosen, with uniform probability, in the interval (0, σ0).
2.3 The market
This section describes the order placement mechanism which is based on the
order-driven market used in Chiarella et al. (2009).
Our N traders can either place market orders, which are immediately exe-
cuted at the current best listed price, or they can place limit orders. Limit
orders are stored in the exchange’s book and executed using time priority at
a given price and price priority across prices. A transaction occurs when a
market order hits a quote on the opposite side of the market.
At the beginning of each period, traders make expectations about the price
at the end of a given time horizon τ (that we take to be the same for all
traders). The future price expected at time tk + τ by agent i is given by
pˆitk,tk+τ = ptke
ritk,tk+τ
√
τ , (5)
where ritk,tk+τ is the agent’s expectation on the spot return given by Eq.
(3) and ptk is the reference price observed by all agents at the beginning of
each period. The square root term indicates that if agents are purely noise
traders (as when in the absence of imitation) they expect prices to be geo-
metric random walks7. After expectations are made, agents enter the market,
sequentially and in a random order and place a buy or a sell order of a certain
size. Orders that are not executed after a period τ are removed from the book.
The number of stocks an agent is willing to hold in its portfolio at a given
price level p depends on the choice of the utility function. Our agents are
modelled as risk averse and maximize an exponential CARA utility function
U(W itk , α) = −e−αW
i
tk , (6)
7The square root term in the geometric Brownian motion is introduced for analogy with
continuous time models. The square term nonetheless could be replaced with a linear term
without considerable implications for the dynamic itself.
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where the coefficient α measures the risk aversion of traders. The portfolio
wealth of each agent is given by
W itk = S
i
tptk + C
i
tk
, (7)
where Sitk ≥ 0 and Citk ≥ 0 are respectively the stock and cash position of
agent i at time tk. The optimal composition of the agent’s portfolio is deter-
mined in the usual way by trading-off expected return against expected risk.
However here the agents are not allowed to engage in short-selling. When
agents place a market order, their cash and stocks positions are updated ac-
cordingly. When agents place a limit order, the cash they commit to buy and
the stocks they commit to sell are tentatively removed from their portfolios
(even if a limit order does not comport an immediate transaction). In this
way agents can not spend money or sell stocks that have already been com-
mitted in the book. If an order is cancelled, the stocks and cash that were
tied down in the order are returned to the trader who had submitted it.
For the CARA utility function assumed here the optimal composition of the
portfolio, that is the number of stocks the agent wishes to hold at any given
price is given by
πi(p) =
ln(pˆitk+τ/p)
αV itkp
, (8)
where V itk is the risk perceived by agent i, normally taken as the unconditional
variance of returns.8. We assume that agents’ risk assessment depend on
their connectivity. In particular, we assume that those agents who are highly
imitated, and consequently, as we will see later, are more successful, flattered
by their numerous followers become more confident about their forecasts.
To these popular agents the risky asset appears as less risky, because they
are good at forecasting it. Thus their assessment of risk is far below the
unconditional variance of the risky asset returns. This effect is captured by
setting
V itk = Vtk(1− (1− w)l%i,tk), (9)
where l%i,tk is the percentage of existing links that point to agent i at time tk.
Note that this implies that highly connected agents are willing to hold larger
amounts of stocks in their portfolio.
Combining equations (5, 8, 9) together, we obtain
πi(p) =
ln(ptk/p) + (wσ
i
0(1 + l
%
i,tk
(1− w))ǫtk + (1− w)σj0(1 + l%j,tk(1− w))ǫtk)
√
τ
α(1− (1− w)l%i,tk)Vtkp
.
(10)
8Eq. (8) can be derived on the basis of mean-variance one-period portfolio optimization.
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The unconditional variance Vtk is estimated as
Vtk =
1
τ
τ∑
j=1
[rtk−j − r¯tk ]2, (11)
where the average spot return r¯t is given by
r¯tk =
1
τ
τ∑
j=1
rtk−j =
1
τ
τ∑
j=1
ln
ptk−j
ptk−j−1
. (12)
If the amount πi(p) is larger (smaller) than the number of stocks already
in the portfolio of agent i then the agent decides to buy (sell). In order to
determine the buy/sell price range of a typical agent, we first estimate nu-
merically the price level p∗ at which agents are satisfied with the composition
of their current portfolio, which is determined by
πi(p∗) =
ln(pˆitk+τ/p
∗)
αV itkp
∗ = S
i
tk
. (13)
Eq. (13) admits a unique solution with 0 < p∗ ≤ pˆitk+τ since Sit ≥ 0 (short
selling is not allowed). Agents are willing to buy at any price p < p∗ since in
this price range their demand is greater than their holding, and are willing
to sell at any price p > p∗ since in this case their demand is less than their
holding. Note that agents may thus wish to sell even if they expect a future
price increase. In order to impose budget constraints we need to restrict to
values of p ≤ pˆit+τ = piM to ensure π(p) ≥ 0 and so rule out short selling.
Furthermore to ensure that an agent i has sufficient cash to purchase the
desired stocks, the smallest value of p we can allow, pim, is determined by its
cash position (see Eq. (7)), and is given by the condition
pim
(
πi(pim)− Sitk
)
= Citk . (14)
Again one can easily show that this equation also admits a unique solution
with 0 < pim ≤ pˆit+τ since Sitk , Citk ≥ 0. Indeed, comparing Eqs. (13) and (14)
it can be easily proven that 0 < pim ≤ p∗ ≤ pˆitk+τ . The price at which the
agent is willing to trade is finally chosen randomly, with uniform probability,
in the interval [pim, p
i
M ]. Suppose now that the agent chooses to trade at a
price p < p∗, then it submits a limit order to buy an amount
si = πi(p)− Sitk ,
while if p > p∗ it submits a limit order to sell an amount
si = Si − πi(p).
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Position Type of order Volume
pim < p < a
q
t BUY Limit order si = π
i(p)− Sit
aqt ≤ p < p∗ BUY Market order si = πi(aqt )− Sit
p = p∗ No order placement
p∗ < p ≤ bqt SELL Market order si = Sit − πi(bqt )
bqt < p ≤ piM SELL Limit order si = Sit − πi(p)
Table 1: Summary of the trading mechanism of a typical trader i with a
random price level p limited between the value pim given by Eq. (14) and the
value piM = pˆ
i
tk+τ i
. The current quoted best ask and best bid are aqtk and b
q
t
respectively.
However if p < p∗ and p > aqt (the best ask) the buy order can be executed
immediately at the ask. An agent in this case would submit a market order
to buy an amount
si = πi(aqtk)− Sitk .
Similarly if p > p∗ and p < bqtk (the best bid) the agent would submit a
market order to sell an amount
si = Sitk − πi(bqtk).
If the depth at the bid (ask) is not enough to fully satisfy the order, the
remaining volume is executed against limit orders in the book. The agent
thus takes the next best buy (sell) order and repeats this operation as many
times as necessary until the order is fully executed. This mechanism applies
under the condition that sufficient quotes of these orders are above (below)
price p. Otherwise, the remaining volume is converted into a limit order at
price p. If the limit order is still unmatched at time tk+ τ it is removed from
the book.
The essential details of the trading mechanism are summarized in Table 1,
showing how it depends on the price level p, the “satisfaction level” p∗, the
best ask aqtk and the best bid b
q
tk
.
3 Simulations and results
The model is studied numerically for different values of the parameter w. In
the first part we focus the analysis on some properties of the network such
as the in-degree and fitness distribution. Then we analyze the probability
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distribution of wealth and stocks and the positive feedback on prices.
In the simulations the number of traders is set at N = 150. Each agent is
initially given the same amount of stock S0 = 100 and cash C0 = 100. The
initial stock price is chosen at p0 = 1000. We fix τ = 200, α = 0.01, and β
i
uniformly distributed in the interval [5, 45] The results reported here are the
outcome of simulations of T = 1000 periods and Nt = 300 trades per period.
Simulations are repeated M = 100 times with a different random seed9.
3.1 The network
In figure (1) we plot one shot of the configuration of the endogenous network
for w = 0.1, w = 0.5 and w = 1.0. The graphs show that few gurus could
co-exist and compete for popularity. As w increases the network becomes
less and less centralized with a higher number of smaller gurus. We can
immediately notice how the network structure depends on the imitation level
w. Links are formed according to preferential attachment and relative wealth
in Eq. (1), but these are independent of w. The weight w, however, affects
the profits of the guru and his followers and, thus, the network formation.
Moreover the topology of the network is different from that of the random
Figure 1: Network configuration for w = 0.1 (the guru is agent 108) (left
side), for w = 0.5 (the guru is agent 78) (centre) and for w = 1 (the guru is
agent 6) (right side).
9We have tested the stability of our results and verified that the model shows a quali-
tatively similar behaviour for a range of values of the parameters.
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graph studied extensively by Erdos and Renyi (1960). While in an Erdos-
Reny random graph the in-degree10 has a Binomial (or Poisson) distribution,
in real world networks some agents are found to have a disproportionately
large number of incoming links while others have very few. In figure. (2) we
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Figure 2: The complementary cumulative distribution (CCD) of the nor-
malized in-degree (left side) and the complementary cumulative distribution
(CCD) of the normalized fitness (right side) for w = 0.1 (black line), w = 0.5
(red line) and w = 1.0 (green line). Colors are available on the web side
version.
plot the complementary cumulative distribution (CCD) of the normalized
in-degree (left side) and the complementary cumulative distribution (CCD)
of the normalized fitness (right side) for w = 0.1 (black line), w = 0.5 (red
line) and w = 1.0 (green line). The distribution of in degree in our model,
when imitation is large, is in keeping with that of scale-free networks and
displays a ’fat tail’.
In Table (2) we plot the index of the current guru (black solid line), the
percentage of incoming links to the current guru (red dotted line) and the
fitness of the current guru (green dashed line), for different w, as function
of the time. The figure shows that agents alternate as the guru during the
simulation (black solid line). In fact, as the guru acquires an increasing num-
10In directed graphs, there is the in-degree, number of edges pointed to it, and out-
degree, number of edges pointing away from it. Note, the out-degree of an agent defined
by those edges starting from i gives the number of his first order neighbours that, in our
model, are constrained to be one.
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ber of links (red dotted line), one or more of his followers may become richer
than the guru himself, as signalled by the fact that the fitness (green dashed
line) of the guru becomes, at times, smaller than 1. As other agents become
rich they start to be imitated more and more and eventually one of them
becomes the new guru.
The stability (or average life) of the guru becomes longer as imitation in-
creases (i.e w decreases) as shown in table (2) (bottom right side).
The evolution of our interaction network is in line with other works (Brock
and Hommes (1998), Lux (1998), LeBaron et al (2009), and Gerasymchuk et
al. (2010)), showing that a switching, driven by profits, creates interesting
dynamics.
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Table 2: The index of current guru (black solid line), the percentage of
incoming link to current guru (red dotted line) and fitness of current guru
(green dashed line) for w = 0.1 (top left side), w = 0.5 (top right side) and
w = 1 (bottom left side). Average Guru’s live as a function of w (bottom
right side). Colors are available on the web side version.
3.2 Wealth analysis
In table. (3) we compare the different performances, in terms of wealth, of
the guru (black line), his direct followers (red line) and the rest of the traders
(green line) for the same parameters as in table (2). Comparing table (3)
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Table 3: Wealth time series of guru (black line), followers (red line) and
rest of the system (green line) for w = 0.1 (top left side), w = 0.5 (top
right side) and w = 1 (bottom left side). Average wealth, over all times and
all simulations, of the guru (black line), followers (red line) and rest of the
system (green line). (bottom right side). Colors are available on the web
side version.
and table (2) we observe that the wealth of the guru increases with the im-
itation (i.e decreasing w) and that the gap between the wealth of the guru
and the wealth of the rest of the system (both followers and non followers)
widens with the level of imitation. This result is better quantified by ta-
ble (3) (bottom right side) that shows the average wealth, over all times and
all simulations, of the gurus (black line), followers (red line) and rest of the
system (green line) as a function of w.
Our findings are in line with theoretical models and laboratory experiments
on noise traders (see Hommes (2006) for a survey of the relevant litera-
ture). All these works have proved that aggressive zero-intelligence agents
gain higher profits thanks to herding behaviors.
In accordance with the empirical evidence (see, for example, Pareto (1897),
Gabaix et al. (2006)), figure (3) shows how, raising imitation, the model gen-
erates heterogeneity, as indicated by the fat tail distribution of agents’ wealth
and stock.
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Figure 3: The decumulative distribution function (DDF) of the wealth (left
side) and the decumulative distribution function (DDF) of the stocks (right
side) for w = 0.1 (black line), w = 0.5 (red line) and w = 1.0 (green line).
Colors are available on the web side version.
3.3 Price Analysis
Figure. (4) shows prices (black lines) and average expected prices (red lines)
for w = 0.1, w = 0.5 and w = 1.0. The trading constrains of the model de-
termine, in the absence of imitation, a sort of equilibrium level around which
the price mean reverts. As imitation increases prices show wilder deviation
from the equilbrium level, and large price jumps11. This result is in line
with other agent-based models (see, for example, Lux and Marchesi (2000),
Iori (2002), Chiarella et al. (2002, 2009), Gaunersdorfer et al. (2008), and
LeBaron et al.(2007, 2009)), all of which show that coordination of traders’
expectations can generate large price fluctuations. For very low level of w
prices do not converge anymore to the equilibrium level (or at least do not
do so on short time scales).
To assess the reciprocal influences among agents and the coordinations
of their strategies, we compute the herding coefficient. Since herding is the
consequence of mimetic responses by agents interacting on a communica-
tion network, for each time tk, the number of agents Trs,tk taking the same
decision to sell on market is measured. So the herding phenomena can be
11Prices do not explode because as agents accumulate a larger fraction of their wealth in
stocks they become more likely to sell and vice-versa, as can be easily seen from equations
(13-14).
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captured at each tk by a simple time varying herding function.
Htk =
Trs,tk
Trtk
∈ [0, 1],
where Trs,tk is the number of sellers at time tk on the market and Trtk is the
total number of active agents per time12. When this function is close to a
half, the market show no herding since traders play without no coordination.
When Htk is close to zero, the market is herding in the direction of buying
and vice versa when Htk=1. Figure (5) (left side) exhibits the average herd-
ing coefficient over time and the number of simulations as a function of w.
Decreasing w, our model exhibits a significant coordination among agents,
as reflected by the high standard deviation of the herding coefficient.
Further, we observe that prices (black line) and expected prices (red line)
follow each other closely when w is small13.
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Figure 4: Prices (black line) and average expected prices (red line) with
w=0.1 (left), w=0.5 (center) and w=1.0 (right). Colors are available on the
web side version.
To better quantify this observation we calculate the mean price deviation
between realized prices and expected prices defined as |ptk−pˆ
i
tk
ptk
|, and average
it over time and the number of simulations. As figure (5) (right side) shows
this deviation is smaller when imitation is high and price expectations be-
come self-fullfilling. As shown in the same figure, in the case of no imitation
12Note that Trtk=Nt = 300.
13According to the literature (see De Long et al. (1990), Hommes et al. (2005), Heemei-
jer et al. (2009)), when in a stock market higher average price forecast produces higher
realized market price we say that there is a positive expectations feedback.
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expected prices become more volatile then realized prices. In this case we
lose both the correlation between expected and realized prices and their large
excursions.
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Figure 5: Average herding coefficient over time and the number of simulations
as a function of w (left side). Deviation between realized prices and expected
prices as a function of w (right side).
3.4 Discussion
To explain the above results we first need to show that the imitation of
expectations translates into imitation of trading actions. An expected price
increase (decrease) in our model does not necessarily lead to a decision to
buy and, even if so, buy order could be submitted as limit orders. Market
orders are more likely to be submitted when agents are very optimistic or
pessimistic. In fact in this case the interval [pm, pM ] over which orders can be
placed is wider and it becomes more likely that a price level is chosen such
that the order can be immediately executed. In our model it is the agents
with many incoming links who forecast a high volatility σit (via equation 4)
and are more likely to submit market orders. In addition, if a popular agent
has enough connections it can influence several others to overestimate price
changes and submit market orders in turns.
In figure. (6) we plot the average fraction of the volume of market orders
to buy or sell, over the total volume of orders in the same direction. The av-
erage is taken over each trading period and plotted for different values of w.
The result shows, as anticipated, that, when increasing imitation, a higher
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Figure 6: Average fraction of the volume of market orders to sell (left) and to
buy (right) over the total volume of orders in the same direction for different
value of w.
fraction of market orders is submitted. Thus the coordination of expectation
leads to a coordination of actions and the model generates a positive expec-
tations feedback system.
In turn, a series of market orders in the same direction can generate consid-
erable price changes, as shown by figure (7) where we observe an increase of
the realized variance of returns for low values of w.
Thus, the forecasts from highly connected agents of an overall high volatil-
ity are self-fulfilling, providing an ex-post justification for equation (4).
Next we explain the distribution of agents’ wealth and stocks holdings. First
of all, as long as the guru is not the last to trade (we assume a random
entrance to the market for all agents including the guru) he will consistently
gain on the trades that follow, in the same direction, his trade. Furthermore,
while agents are risk averse, highly connected agents underestimate risk, ac-
cording to equation (9). Consequently these traders, when w is small and
their percentage of incoming links, l%, is high, invest more (on average) in
the risky asset than others, as confirmed by figure (8). Followers in turn
invest on average more than non followers because they, like the guru, over-
estimate returns. By investing more, gurus and followers earn, on average,
higher profits than no followers (as was shown in table (3)).
These results are in line with other studies on noise traders risk with positive
feedback in financial markets. Particularly, De Long et al. (1990a) show that
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Figure 7: Mean and variance of returns as a function of w.
noise traders can earn higher returns solely by bearing more of the risk that
they themselves create14. Our results are in line with previous studies(see
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985), Heemeijer et al. (2009)) and confirm that
traders have an incentive to imitate and a desire to be imitated, since pre-
dicting a price close to the predictions of other players turns out to be most
profitable.
4 Competitive strategies
In this section, our goal is to understand the impact of more ’rational strate-
gies’ on agents’ performances. In order to do so, we introduce in the baseline
model two groups of agents able to counteract the guru. Specifically, we
focus our attention on chartist and fundamentalist strategies. In financial
literature, in fact, Chartists mirror myopic strategies, while Fundamentalists
represent some sort of ’full rationality’.
14An example of this phenomenon, known under the name of market manipulation, is
the ’pool’ in RCA stock operated by Michael Meehan between March 7 and March 22,
1929. (see De Long et al. (1990b))
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Figure 8: Mean size of orders of the guru(black) and the rest of the system
(red) as a function of w. Colors are available on the web side version.
As a first exercise, we add to the model 10 chartists, c. These agents do
not imitate and are not imitated by any one else. Chartists expected returns
in the interval (tk, tk + τ) are given by
rˆctk,tk+τ = r¯tk (15)
where r¯tk is the chartists’ expected trend based on the observations of the
average spot returns over last τ time steps, as defined in Eq. (12). The
following results reproduce the outcome of 10 simulation runs of 10000 steps
for different levels of imitation w. In table (4) (first raw) we report the av-
erage time at which gurus wealth dominates the wealth of the chartists. For
high levels of imitation, w = 0.1, the guru15 performs quickly better than
chartists. In an intermediate scenario of imitation, w = 0.5, competition
between guru and chartists becomes tighter and the two strategies initially
appear to be equivalent. Also in this case, however, the guru eventually
prevails over Chartists. Only in the absence of herding, w = 1, myopic
strategies are the most successful over the ten full simulation runs. This
is due to the fact that, with no imitation, prices have a mean-reverting be-
haviour and chartist strategies succeed at forecasting future price movements
15While not reported in the table for this level of w also the guru’ followers perform
better than the chartists.
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from past trends. Nonethelss, as imitation increases, with the guru randomly
choosing the direction of his trades at each time step, price fluctuations be-
come uncorrelated over time and past trends cannot predict anymore future
price movements. Overall the average percentage of guru’s incoming links is
lower than in the baseline model and the average life of the guru shorter, as
shown in figure (9). A simple myopic strategy, therefore, is not sufficient to
destroy the impact of herding, but reduces the guru influence on the market.
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Figure 9: Highest value of guru’s in-coming links (left side) and guru’s life
(right side) averaged over 10 simulations as a function of w for the base-
line model (black solid line), the case with Chartist strategies (red dotted
line), the case with fundamentalist strategies (green dashed line). Colors are
available in the web side version.
In a second exercise, we add to the model 10 fundamentalists, f . Such
as chartists, fundamentalists do not imitate and are not imitated by other
agents. They form an expectation about the spot return, rˆftk,tk+τ , in the
interval (tk, tk + τ), as follow
rˆftk,tk+τ =
1
τ
ln(pf/pt) (16)
where pf is the fundamental value and τ is the time scale at which funda-
mentalists expect the price to mean revert to the fundamental level. The
equilibrium level is calculated separately for each simulation run, by pre-
running each simulation for 1000 steps in the absence of herding and of
fundamentalist strategies. Once the equilibrium level has been determined,
we assume that the fundamentalists know it and take it is the fundamental
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price. In table (4) (second row) we report the average time at which gurus
wealth dominates the wealth of the fundamentalist. When imitation is very
high, the guru and the fundamentalists compete among themselves for long
time periods, until the guru manages to attract many followers, and gains
over the rest of the system. Increasing w, however, fundamentalists predomi-
nate over the system. Even more than in the case of chartists, the presence of
fundamentalist reduces the influence of the guru on the system, the guru does
not perform sufficiently well to attract a large number of followers and his
life time becomes shorter than in the baseline model (as shown in figure (9)).
Imitation level w =0.1 w=0.5 w =1
W ct¯ < W
g
t¯
Ave t¯: 400, st.dev: 230 Ave t¯: 2507, st.dev: 1022 never
W f
t¯
< W g
t¯
Ave t¯: 800, st.dev 122 never never
Table 4: Average time (t¯) at which the guru’s wealth (W g) dominates the
two competitive strategies (Chartists (W c) & Fundamentalists (W f )) across
10 Monte Carlo simulations of T = 10000 periods at different level of w.
To summarize, our results show that, when imitation is high, the guru over-
performs both chartist and fundamentalist strategies. Chartistist strategies
are dominated by herding in a shorter period than the fundamentalist ones.
Nevertheless, decreasing the imitation level, the guru needs a longer time to
undermine the chartists, and definitely loses his advantage over fundamen-
talists.
In line with other works (see Hommes (2006) for a survey of the relevant
literature), we can conclude that, risk averse ’rational agents’ are not able to
counteract noise traders when herding occurs, contradicting the Friedman’ s
hypothesis.
5 Conclusions
Our results allow us to conclude that profit is a good mechanism of links
formation, capable of generating the famous Matthew effect. The endoge-
nous attachment mechanism introduced in our model allows a guru to emerge
spontaneously in the system, rise and fall in popularity over time, and possi-
bly be replaced by a new guru. A few gurus could also co-exist and compete
among themselves for popularity. Our endogenous attachment mechanism
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succeed at creating, sustaining and destroying a guru, because agents benefit
both from imitating and being imitated. In fact, if an agent profits from
being imitated, he becomes richer, which induces an even larger fraction of
agents to follow him. Nonetheless, if only the agents who are imitated benefit
from imitation, once an agent becomes the guru he would remain the guru
for ever. On the other hand, if followers also profit from imitating the guru,
they could eventually outperform the guru and become guru in turn.
The fact that our unsophisticated investors, trivially driven by imitative be-
haviour, can earn very high profits implies that Friedman’s hypothesis is
inadequate. The assumption that noise traders quickly go bankrupt and are
eliminated from the market is unrealistic in presence of herding and posi-
tive feedback. In fact we have shown that more sophisticated strategies, i.e
chartist and fundamentalist, underperform the guru and his followers when
imitation is high. These results should not be underestimated, particularly
in those situations when market prices exhibit large fluctuation. In these
cases in fact is unlikely that prices incorporate true information and the idea
of full rationality is implausible.
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